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“RUBBER WILL NOT KEEP IN THIS COUNTRY”: FAILED DEVELOPMENT IN BENIN, 1897-1921 
 
JAMES FENSKE1 
 
ABSTRACT. Although Nigeria's Benin region was a major rubber producer in 1960, the industry 
faltered before 1921. I use labour scarcity and state capacity to explain why rubber did not 
take hold in this period. The government was unable to protect Benin's rubber forests from 
over-exploitation. Plantations found it difficult to recruit workers, and the government was 
unwilling to allow expatriates to acquire land. Colonial officials promoted the development of 
“communal” plantations, but these suffered due to labour scarcity and a state that was short 
on staff and equipment, and dependent on local chiefs. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
African history is littered with development projects that failed spectacularly 
(Bromund, 1997; Ferguson, 1990; Mackenzie, 1998). The colonial government in 
Nigeria’s Benin region spent the first two decades of the twentieth century 
unsuccessfully promoting rubber production. In 1921, motivated by low producer 
prices and Britain’s global policy of reducing rubber acreage, the Director of Agriculture 
wrote that his department would cease distributing seeds, since it was “not desirable 
that we should appear to in any way be advocating the planting of this product” 
(Anschel, 1965, p. 51).  Though this appears at first to be simply one more botched 
attempt at development, it is a puzzle when set against Benin’s later history. By 1961, 
Nigeria was Africa’s largest producer of natural rubber, and the bulk of this was 
produced around Benin. This slow start contrasts not only with Benin’s later history, 
but also with the rapid spread of other cash crops during the same period, such as cocoa 
in south-western Nigeria and Ghana (Austin, 2005; Berry, 1975). This example, then, 
can help explain the failures of development projects and technological diffusion in 
areas where the project or technology is suited to the physical environment.  
Why did rubber development fail in Benin before 1921? Neither prices nor 
government disinterest can explain this episode. Nominal rubber prices were 17% 
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higher during the post-war rubber boom (1946-1960) than from 1900 to 1921,2 but 
annual physical output was more than 35 times greater.3 Further, production rose 
steadily from 1932 to 1939, when prices were lower than in either of these periods. 
Before 1921, the government actively encouraged production of both wild and planted 
rubber. 
I argue that the labour scarcity and state capacity are what constrained rubber 
during this period. Wild rubber failed because the colonial state lacked the ability to 
adequately monitor tapping and because it undermined existing systems of property 
rights, converting a formerly common property resource into open access. These 
problems were made worse by the region's scarcity of labour. Private plantations of 
local Funtumia rubber and Brazilian Para rubber struggled to find labour.4 Expatriates 
also confronted a colonial state that believed acquisition of land by foreigners would 
undermine its strategy of indirect rule. “Communal” plantations too coped with the 
unavailability of labour. Further, the colonial state was dependent on local chiefs who 
appropriated the benefits of these plantations. Short on staff and equipment, the state 
was unable to effectively maintain its investment or pass skills to locals. The 
government failed to forecast the destructive effect of Asian production on the price of 
rubber. 
In this paper, I use archival evidence to support this explanation. The scarcity of 
quantitative data for this period makes it impossible to use credible counterfactuals to 
sort out the difficulties in Benin’s rubber industry that had the greatest impact. I am 
able, however, to show that the key problems identified in the archival record were also 
present in other cases of failed rubber development. Wild rubber elsewhere in Africa 
and plantations in both Africa and Brazil faced many of the same problems as Benin. 
Further, these constraints were largely absent from Brazilian wild rubber or from 
plantations in southeast Asia, and had been substantially relaxed when Benin became a 
successful exporter of rubber after the Second World War. 
I add to our knowledge of several issues. First, the slow adoption of new technologies 
in developing countries remains a barrier to growth. Existing studies have emphasized 
factors such as costly learning (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010), 
heterogeneous returns (Suri, 2010; Zeitlin, 2011), and fixed costs combined with 
present-bias (Duflo et al., forthcoming). I add to this literature by including explanatory 
variables that vary over time and space in their ability to delay technological change. 
While labour scarcity in particular is understood as an important determinant of 
technological change by economic historians (e.g. Allen, 2009), it has not featured 
largely in the more recent literature in development. 
I also contribute to our understanding of state capacity and labour scarcity as 
determinants of development. African history provides many examples of initiatives 
                                                          
2 Anschel (1965) gives price figures that average £153 per ton from 1900 to 1921, £179 per ton from 
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JAMES FENSKE 
 
3 
 
that failed due the prejudices, ignorance, and weakness of colonial and post-colonial 
states. Similarly, African states have often adopted policies that hinder development in 
order to ensure their own political survival (Bates, 1981; Van der Walle, 2001). The 
colonial state in Benin lacked the knowledge and resources to directly implement and 
enforce its policies. Reliance on local chiefs and staff whose incentives did not match 
those of the state limited the effectiveness of its development initiatives. An old 
literature in African history suggests that scarce labour has been an important factor in 
the continent’s development (Austin, 2008; Fenske, 2011a,b; Hopkins, 1973). Similarly, 
economists understand that population is crucial for development, over the long run 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002) and over the very long run (Galor and Weil, 2000). I show that 
labour scarcity hindered both labour-intensive production and the management of a 
common property resource in Benin.  
In the next section, I provide background on rubber and on Benin. I describe my 
sources and how I use these to explain the failure of rubber in Benin before 1921. In the 
subsequent sections, I discuss wild rubber, privately-owned plantations, and the 
government-supported communal plantations in turn. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND SOURCES 
 
The vulcanization of rubber in 1843 made it useful for hoses, tubing, springs, 
washers, diaphragms, and other industrial applications, spurring demand that was 
accelerated by the later spread of bicycles and automobiles (Harms, 1975). Before Asian 
supply lowered world prices, Africans exported wild rubber to meet this demand. The 
largest African exporters during this period were Angola, the Congo Free State, the 
French Congo, French Guinea, and the Gold Coast. I focus on rubber production in the 
area surrounding the Edo-speaking Kingdom of Benin, centred on the Benin District of 
colonial Nigeria. In 1897, following the massacre of an expeditionary party, Britain 
sacked Benin. 
Though rubber was important to Benin’s late colonial economy, the industry has 
received little historical notice. Anschel (1965) and Blanckenburg (1963) describe the 
industry as it was in the 1960s. Afigbo (1970), Egboh (1985), Igbafe (1979) and 
Usuanlele (1988, 2003) each give a few pages to rubber in their broader studies. I add 
to these accounts, using colonial annual reports, records of the West African Lands 
Committee (WALC), and correspondence from the National Archives of the United 
Kingdom (NAUK) in Kew and the National Archives of Nigeria in Ibadan (NAI). 
I am constrained by these sources to use a mostly qualitative analysis. Excepting total 
rubber exports from Nigeria, there are no systematic data available for rubber in Benin.5 
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Nigeria; neither does Anschel (1965). 
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Other sources of quantitative information are scattered and are not consistent.6 The 
scattered estimates that exist of the quantities relevant to rubber production are so 
variable that no counterfactual exercise can be credible.7 Instead, I examine the 
problems that faced the industry that are identified by colonial staff, officials, 
expatriates, and Africans themselves in archival correspondence. For this period in sub-
Saharan Africa, almost all written sources have a colonial origin. This presents two 
challenges: bias and selectivity.  
Colonial sources are biased. Officials highlight problems not of their own making. For 
example, writers might emphasize the low quality of rubber while staying silent about 
the labour demands created by road work.  I use three strategies to remedy this. First, 
non-official voices are represented as a minority voice in the records. Africans’ views 
are forwarded to colonial authorities as letters, reports from subordinate officers, and 
court testimonies. Expatriate planters and traders also express their views in the 
correspondence. These counterbalance the official narrative. Second, I draw from the 
existing literature to provide additional information about what is absent in the official 
record. Usuanlele (1988, 2003) is indispensable here. Finally, I use the comparative 
approach described below.  
Colonial sources require the reader to select the evidence that is most relevant. 
Several problems with rubber are mentioned in the records. Those that were not pivotal 
are still a part of history, and I include them in my narrative. Still, this does not tell us 
which difficulties actually mattered. I rely in part on the judgments of contemporaries; if 
observers in several sectors of the rubber industry describe the difficulty of keeping 
workers as an important concern, it is likely that this was a major obstacle that 
participants faced. I am also able to rely on a comparative approach. I identify features 
that Benin has in common with other areas in which rubber failed, and features that 
distinguish it from areas where rubber was more successful. There are four 
comparisons that I use. First, I contrast Benin with other parts of Africa. Countries that 
experienced destruction of wild rubber and failure of expatriate plantations faced 
similar difficulties. Second, I contrast Benin with Asia. Many of the problems I identify 
were overcome in Malaya and Sumatra. Third, I compare Benin to Brazil. Brazil 
                                                          
6 For example, the annual reports do not give the same information about rubber every year. The 1909 
annual report (p. 14) states the amount of revenue collected in rubber licenses. The 1908 report does not. 
The 1908 report states the amount of rubber produced specifically in the Central Province, but notes that 
this cannot be separated from the rubber produced in Northern Nigeria and shipped through the Central 
Province. The 1908 annual report states that there are 2,251 Funtumia plantations with 1,125,972 trees 
in the Central Province (p. 15), while no similar figure is stated in the 1907 or 1909 reports. 
7 Take, for example, the expected yield of rubber from a Funtumia tree. The report on the communal 
plantations for 1913 (NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914) gives estimates of the yields achieved per tree in 
the Benin City district between 1910 and 1913 of 1 oz to 1.59 oz per tree; any counterfactual revenue 
calculation will change by 60% based on whether the high or low estimate is used. In the same period, 
other plantations in Cameroon and Ilesha had reported yields of 2.5 oz and 13 oz per tree (NAUK, CO 852 
515 7: Commodities Rubber Nigeria. West African Rubber Mission Report on Nigeria and British 
Cameroons, Appendix 2). Christy (1911, p. 193) reported that, in years 6 through 10, a Funtumia tree 
would give 4, 5, 9, 12 and 15 oz of dry rubber per year. Bell (1907) suggested that 16 oz per tree per year 
was normal for Funtumia in Uganda. There is evidence, then, to support ex ante expected yields per tree 
ranging from 1oz to 16oz per year. Similar levels of uncertainty exist for labour inputs and costs, and 
there is almost no information available on capital requirements or processing and transport costs. 
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achieved greater success with wild rubber than Benin, but suffered from a similar 
inability to develop rubber plantations. Fourth, Benin’s later success as a rubber 
producer is partly explained by the removal of the restrictions I identify.  
 
3. WILD RUBBER 
 
In this section, I outline the trade in wild (mostly Funtumia) rubber that followed 
Britain’s conquest of Benin. I begin by noting that Benin’s wild rubber was one of the 
resources that made the kingdom an attractive prize for Britain. Soon after British 
conquest, non-Edo moved in and began tapping the region’s trees to exhaustion. Britain 
made efforts to restrict tapping early on, and I use records of the prosecutions of illicit 
tappers to expose the difficulties in enforcing these regulations. Though amended 
regulations appeared initially to have stopped the problem, these eventually failed. I 
argue that the new government could not police over-exploitation of Benin’s rubber. 
First, the colonial state lacked the capacity to adequately monitor tapping. Second, it 
undermined existing systems of property rights, and was incapable of replacing them. 
Other regions of Africa coped with over-tapping of wild rubber during the same period, 
for similar reasons. In Brazil, by contrast, property rights over wild rubber were well-
defined, limiting these difficulties. Both of these problems were compounded by Benin’s 
labour scarcity. 
 
Conquest 
 
Though Europeans stressed humanitarianism and the Oba’s tyranny as motives for 
conquest, Igbafe (1970) demonstrates economic motives were important. I add to 
Igbafe’s evidence, showing that traders and British officials noticed Benin’s untapped 
rubber and hinted that regime change would bring these into production. In an 1892 
report, the Commissioner of the Niger Coast Protectorate wrote to the Foreign Secretary 
that “[t]here is plenty of rubber in the country, but the natives have a great 
disinclination to start working a new commodity.”8 One trader in 1896 reported that the 
Oba would not allow his own people to collect rubber, and turned back those who 
sought to open up trade (Ofonagoro, 1979, p. 149). Miller’s agent at Ughoton informed 
the consul in 1896 that, while there was “plenty” of rubber in the country, he was 
unable to get a “rubber man” from Cape Coast to collect it, since he would not go far 
from Ughoton, having been twice “maltreated while away in the bush” (Ryder, 1969, p. 
277). He added that if “Benin was under proper Government and the resources of the 
country properly developed ... the exports would be very great.”9 
In 1896, a Lagos man went to the Oba on the advice of the Commissioner, Moor, “with 
a view to asking the King to start the ‘rubber’ industry, the country abounding in that 
product.” Phillips reported that the man offered presents worth more than £30, but had 
                                                          
8 NAUK, FO 2/51. Enc. in Jan 12, 1893: Macdonald to Rosebery. 
9 NAUK, FO 2/102: 24 Nov, 1896: Phillips to Under-Secretary of State; Enc: 9 Nov, 1896: Brownridge to 
Phillips. 
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no success. He warned the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies that his 
instructions “to deal with this matter by pacific means have been literally obeyed and 
have failed to produce the results desired.”10 In November 1897, soon after the fall of 
Benin, Moor reported the 25% increase in rubber exports to be “satisfactory,” adding 
“and I anticipate considerable increase in the future as much trouble has been taken to 
open up rubber production...A rich country has been opened up to the influence of 
civilization and trade, containing extensive rubber forests...”11 
 
Overexploitation 
 
After the conquest, the chiefs Ologbosheri and Abohun launched a guerrilla campaign 
against the new rulers, while the British worked to impose their authority. Amidst this 
confusion, the government struggled to police rubber exploitation by Yoruba and Fante 
tapping gangs and by the Royal Niger Company, who sought to take advantage of the 
change in regime. The British believed these outsiders were aiding Ologbosheri and 
Abohun. Fosbery reported that “undoubtedly all the rubber cutters in that part of the 
country were in his favour, and on the day of the first engagement our men were cursed 
from the bush by Yorubas.”12 Later on, he met a man called Deji, living at Isua. “This 
man’s residence,” he noted, “was undoubtedly the head centre of all the Yoruba rubber 
cutters in that part of the district; both these men were arrested, with several of their 
followers.”13 
Royal Niger Company agents moved into subject towns, encouraging them to ignore 
British officers. Moor reported that, during the expedition against Ologbosheri, arms 
and ammunition had “found their way into the disaffected area from the territories of 
the Royal Niger Company, and were no doubt exchanged for the rubber.”14 He believed 
there was a “a general league between the rebels, the local inhabitants, and the Yorubas 
who were in the territories as traders in rubber.”15 While some of this had found its way 
into Benin City, the majority he believed had been pushed into RNC territory, and RNC 
markings had been found on the guerrillas’ kegs of powder. Rubber continued to pass 
into RNC territory after this; the defendants in Regina v. Akonweli, Odutala, and Ola16 
claimed to be employed by a man named Omoli, living in RNC territory, who had sent 
them to Ipoki to work rubber. 
Intensive tapping by these outsiders raised yields but damaged the trees. In a 
situation that resembled open access, the predictable result was overexploitation. In 
1901, the Resident recalled that it was “deplorable to see what destruction was wrought 
                                                          
10 NAUK, FO 2/102. 16 Nov, 1896: Phillips to Under-Secretary of State. 
11 Niger Coast Protectorate, Annual Report for 1896-7, p. 10. 
12 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri 
and Abohun by Fosbery. 
13 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri 
and Abohun by Fosbery. 
14 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: #1: May 27, 1899: Moor to Chamberlain. 
15 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: #1: May 27, 1899: Moor to Chamberlain. 
16 NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899. 
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by the foreign element some years ago around Ibewhe. Dead rubber trees can be 
counted by the hundred.”17 Fosberry expressed concern that the Yorubas had killed 
many of the local Funtumia, but also described his hope that the recently enacted 
rubber regulations (described below) would improve matters: 
 
The bush passed through between Iho and Isure, Isua and Ihuekpe has been a 
very rich rubber country, but I regret to say is now full of dead rubber trees. 
... The natives stated they never worked rubber, that it was done entirely by 
the Yorubas. I expounded the rubber regulations on every available 
opportunity, and urged the people to protect the riches of their country. ... 
This rubber has of course been a great source of revenue to Ologbosheri.18 
 
First  regulations 
 
British efforts to deal with this problem began with “makeshift” regulations, imposed 
in 1897 “to stop foreigners entering the Benin country for the purpose of working the 
economic products therein.”19 Non-Edo were required to obtain licenses from the 
Resident every 6 months for 10s. The regulations prohibited all persons from “tapping 
rubber trees in such a manner as to permanently damage them or to interfere with their 
future yield.” The “Chiefs of the districts” were made responsible for supervising 
adherence, and were to be awarded half penalties after convictions (Afigbo, 1970). 
Though the colonial office was unsure whether these regulations were legal, Fosbery 
promoted them during his operations against Ologbosheri. 
Prosecutions under these regulations tell us about the tappers who moved into 
Benin, and the difficulty of enforcement.20 First, enforcement required policing by 
colonial staff such as forest guards. Second, these officials required cooperation from 
local communities. Third, tappers operated in gangs; if a few violators were caught, 
many would escape. Finally, the court was eager to use harsh sanctions against illicit 
tappers. 
Monitoring required colonial staff. The defendant in Regina v. Olowo had been 
trained by the Government rubber inspector. He and four others sent out six months 
earlier had not been seen since. He was arrested with three others in Owedou, but three 
of his accomplices escaped. He and his brother worked together, the defendant selling 
his product “for a piece of cloth,” and his brother for 7/6. He was sentenced to one 
month of hard labour. Quality too needed policing. Regulations passed over the 
objections of European traders in 1897 allowed confiscation of adulterated rubber, with 
fines of up to £50 with six months imprisonment (Igbafe, 1979). In Regina v. Osufu Jebu, 
Sumola, and Bakari, the prosecution witness (a Captain) stated that he found Osufu at 
                                                          
17 NAUK, CO 520/7, 26/2/1901: Resident Benin City to Moor. 
18 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri 
and Abohun by Fosbery. 
19 NAUK, CO 444/1, 5 March, 1899: Moor to Under-Secretary of State. Concerns about the legality of these 
regulations are cited in the margin notes in this file. 
20 All of the cases cited here are from NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899. 
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Udo, carrying adulterated rubber towards Lagos. The prisoners claimed they had 
bought it in Benin City and did not know it was adulterated. They were imprisoned with 
hard labour for six months. 
Community cooperation was necessary. The same Captain told the court in Regina v.  
Jegidi and Agbi that, while in the same area, the residents of Obahon informed him that 
the defendants were cutting rubber. They claimed to be from Umapa, but “the natives of 
that village,” told him that they had never seen the men before. The Captain was also the 
prosecution witness in Regina v. Ground Nut, Jack, and Josiah. The defendants in that 
case had been arrested by the headman of Rejain with “a lot of tools etc. used for 
working rubber.” The Captain told the court that he had previously instructed the 
headman to arrest all those cutting rubber without a license. Their sentence was two 
years imprisonment with hard labour. In addition, the court noted that Ground Nut was 
a Mendi (likely Mende, from Sierra Leone) who had deserted government service. 
Monitoring was made more difficult by the size of tapping gangs. The defendant in 
Regina v. Thomas Ouami was charged as the headman of a gang of illicit rubber 
workers. The prosecution witness, T.A. Moses, a rubber inspector, stated that he found 
the prisoner working rubber with a large gang of men under him. On recognizing Moses, 
Ouami ordered his men to escape, begged Moses not to report him to the Consul, and 
offered a bribe. The acting resident also considered a prior record against the defendant 
for obtaining money by false pretences as evidence of bad character, and sentenced him 
to 9 months of hard labour. 
In Regina v. Ipapa, Ehenua, Obasuye, Asaota, and Jegede, the defendants were 
described as “a portion of a gang of 150 who were surprised by the Yorubas of the town 
working rubber near Okiewo.” They were found with rubber just collected in a calabash 
and rubber gouges, and were sentenced to 1 year hard labour each. The defendant in 
Regina v. Jagbohun was charged with not leaving Benin after being found guilty of 
“complicity with illicit rubber workers.” Ten days later, he was brought down from Isua, 
pleading that he was trying to catch illicit rubber workers. The incredulous Acting 
Resident sentenced him to six months hard labour. 
Punishments were harsh. In Regina v. Gbeson and Aburonke, Regina v. Adeanju, and 
Regina v. Lawojo and Omoleye, the defendants were each sentenced to six months or 
one year each for “illicit rubber working” or “working rubber without a license.” By 
contrast, a man who stole a goat from the market to pay a debt of 8s was sentenced to 
14 days hard labour, a man who three times abducted the same female slave of a chief 
was fined £1 and given three dozen lashes, and a man convicted of “resisting the 
government” was given one year of hard labour.21 Notably, there is only one rubber case 
in this book in which the defendant is acquitted.22 
The regulations were soon found inadequate (Afigbo, 1970). In October 1898, 
Gallwey reported that Benin was “full of rubber,” but that the Acting Resident had 
“continually been complaining” of the destruction of rubber trees due to “the manner in 
                                                          
21 Regina v. Peter, Regina v. Bujlu (?) Abudu Ipede, and Regina v. Oriegbe, respectively. 
22 Regina v. Osun and Abiomo; no reason is given for why charges are dismissed. 
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which the natives tapped them.” The number of trees killed amounted to “no small 
figure.”23 In February 1899, Moor stated that it was “utterly impracticable to preserve 
the rubber forests in the Benin City District unless there be a special European officer 
detailed for the work.” Officers had tried to deal with this, but their “enormous amount 
of other work” made it impossible to supervise the Native Inspectors. In his opinion, the 
matter was “pressing”, and “of great importance for the rubber forests in question are of 
very considerable extent and of great value.”24 
 
Further restrictions  
 
In 1899, the regulations were amended. The maximum imprisonment was extended 
to two years, and a closed season was imposed from December to June (Afigbo, 1970). 
The Forestry Department was created in 1900, and its chief concern “was the 
preservation of the extensive rubber forests in the Benin territories.” Gallwey credited 
Hitchens, the Forestry Inspector, for the “very energetic manner in which he carried out 
this work, and for the successful efforts he made to educate the Binis to safeguard the 
rubber trees.”25 Hitchens reported that he had inspected and assessed the value of the 
rubber forests belonging to nearly 100 Bini villages, and created “staffs of ex-officio 
rubber inspectors” in each of them.26 He instructed locals in tapping, explained the 
regulations, and “constitute[ed] every Bini an ex-officio policeman to bring to justice 
any rubber gatherer infringing on the regulations.” In his view, the Bini “responded with 
alacrity,” exercising “such restraining influence on prohibited rubber-tapping and 
adulterated rubber-producing that not a single rubber gatherer is free from close 
‘shadowing,’ and not a single ball of rubber and prohibited root rubber could work its 
undetected way to Lagos or our own trading factories.” 1900, the Forestry Proclamation 
was issued; this required licenses from the District Commissioner, outlined the 
permitted methods of tapping, and applied to all persons, not only foreigners (Afigbo, 
1970, p. 390) 
At first, these appeared to work. More than £700 was collected as license fees from 
Benin in 1900.27 The Acting High Commissioner noted a fall in rubber exports in 1902, 
arguing timber had attracted “many who formerly collected rubber, and the legislation 
which has stopped the destruction of rubber trees is probably a second cause which 
accounts for the decline.”28 In 1904, Egerton suggested the Forestry Department was 
“fully organized and capable of exercising an efficient control over timber cutting and, in 
a lesser degree, over the proper tapping of rubber-bearing plants.”29 
Thompson, the Conservator of Forests, wrote in 1906 in glowing terms about the 
license system. He felt the rubber rules were working “very smoothly” in the Central 
                                                          
23 NAUK, FO 2/185; Oct 26, 1898: Gallwey to Salisbury. 
24 NAUK, FO 2/185; 17 Feb, 1899: Moor to Under-Secretary of State. 
25 Southern Nigeria Annual Report 1899/00, p. 9. 
26 Southern Nigeria Annual Report 1899/00, p. 9. 
27 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900, p. 14. 
28 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1902, p. 21. 
29 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904, p. 4. 
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Province, where the chiefs had taken “an active interest in protecting their forests, and 
the inhabitants are becoming very law-abiding in this respect.” 30 1114 licenses were 
issued, resulting in £671 10s paid. 645 of these were given in Benin City.  
The regulations were, however, ultimately unsuccessful. The Annual Report for 1908 
was gloomy, stating that “[r]ubber appears to be a rapidly decaying business ... the 
Southern production in 1908 was 713,000 lbs. only, as compared with 1,656,000 lbs. in 
1907. … the reckless destruction of trees by excessive bleeding is largely responsible for 
the drooping business.” Despite this, there were only 12 prosecutions and 10 
convictions under the rubber rules. The 1913 report for Benin commented on a falling 
off in rubber exports, blaming this on prices and “the fact that the wild rubber is much 
scarcer than formerly.”31 British regulations had not stopped resource exhaustion. 
 
State capacity 
 
Why did these fail? I argue that the state lacked the capacity to enforce them. First, 
production was difficult to police. Second, the British weakened the existing state and 
the local system of property rights, lacking the trust and resources necessary to replace 
these. The regulations diverted some of the trade from Benin to Lagos as early as 
1901.32 Similarly, because Northern Nigeria had no similar regulations, rubber was 
smuggled to the North (Egboh, 1985, p. 57). In 1901, a representative of Miller Brothers 
wrote to Moor, informing him of the challenges. “Few of those who bring down rubber,” 
he argued, were “able to give a detailed account of its history from the time of 
manufacture, as it may have passed through many hands before reaching theirs.” 
Rubber was sold in many markets on its way to the coast, and “many of the rubber 
traders here are preparing to leave the district as they profess themselves unable any 
longer to conduct business here under the vexatious conditions in force.” Though every 
Edo was eligible for a reward of £2 for any conviction, the people had not looked after 
their own interests, in his view.33 
In 1905, the Governor recognized that prohibitions on root rubber were no longer 
enforced.34 Christy (1911) pointed out that, while 221,566 lbs were exported from 
Southern Nigeria in 1907, only £53/10 was collected in license fees.35 It was impossible 
that 107 license holders could be responsible for this quantity, so the bulk must have 
been illicit. Even if the forestry staff were increased fifty times, he thought it would be 
impossible to police the area: 
 
So long as the native can sell his ‘lump’ rubber at an enormous profit, so long 
will he continue his destructive methods of tapping, and his dirty, primitive 
                                                          
30 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 31. 
31 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
32 NAUK, CO 520/9. 17 Oct, 1901: Acting High Commissioner to Secretary of State 
33 NAUK, CO 520/9, 13 July, 1901: McLucas and Schaumburg (for Miller Bros and Bey & Zimmer) to Moor 
34 NAUK, CO 520/30, 5March, 1905: Egerton to Lyttelton. 
35 Though this contradicts the figure in the Annual Report, the figure in that report is larger, making the 
argument stronger. 
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system of preparation, despite voluminous rules and regulations, which he 
could not understand, even supposing them ever to reach himself or his chief 
(Christy, 1911, p. 13). 
 
Ostrom (1991) argues that effective resource management requires defined 
boundaries, easy identification of those with user rights, rules appropriate to local 
conditions, accountable monitors, graduated sanctions, rapid and low-cost conflict 
resolution, and recognition of users’ rights to devise their own institutions. British 
conquest weakened Benin’s borders, rules were imposed by an external authority 
without local participation, colonial agents lacked accountability, and courts in Benin 
City were eager to impose maximum penalties. 
Before 1897, Edo villages could control access to their forest resources. Outside his 
own village, an Edo obtained permission from the local Enogie or Odionwere to use the 
forest, until he settled permanently (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45). Hunters, “native and non-
native” turned the hand of any animal caught to the Enogie, and the Oba was owed a leg 
and tusk of any elephant killed (Egharevba, 1949, p. 43-44). Non-Edo were required to 
settle and assimilate (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45). After 1897, outsiders came in seeking 
rights to farm, fish, and reap palm fruits, and the colonial government was slow to 
establish effective regulations to control these demands. Yoruba settlers gained land 
without holding title through the Oba; these were not regularized under a Native Court 
Rule until 1914 (Rowling, 1948, p. 11). 
An 1896 editorial in the Lagos Weekly Record asserted Oba’s power make “short 
work” of intruders, wishing that “the greedy rubber hunters” in the Lagos hinterland 
“should one and all be dispatched to the domains of the expeditious King of Benin” 
(quoted by Ofonagoro (1979, p. 120)). This was not speculative talk. Members of the 
British punitive expedition in 1897 found a gang of nine outsiders who had gone to 
Benin to collect rubber. Despite being armed with revolvers, they had been taken 
prisoner and held in Benin for two months, bound so they would hang themselves were 
they to lie down (Ling Roth, 1903, p. 68). Similarly, in February 1897, Moor reported 
that six “Accra men, captured in the Mahin country rubber collecting during the last few 
months, came in from the bush heavily ironed”.36 
The 1908 trade report reached a similar conclusion; the situation was not adequate 
to protect rubber trees from destruction: 
 
[N]ot until rubber trees are owned by individuals, who will see that they are 
duly protected, can this industry be looked upon as a permanent one in 
Nigeria. Thousands of trees in the forests, which are practically a ‘no man’s 
land,’ are destroyed each year by overtapping, and although every effort is 
made by the Forestry Department, with the staff at its command, to regulate 
the gathering and to prevent indiscriminate bleeding, the task in so large a 
                                                          
36 NAUK, FO 881/7002: Feb 24, 1897: Moor to Salisbury. Presumably, “ironed” means “in irons.” 
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country and amidst dense forests is, it must be admitted, and extremely 
difficult one.37 
 
The colonial Forest Guards were inadequate and corrupt. In 1899, the defendant in 
Regina v. Amidu38 was charged with seizing a government rubber inspector. The 
inspector came across a “large gang of Lagos rubber cutters.” The defendant captured 
the inspector and his two carriers, tied them up, and flogged him. The Resident 
complained in 1901 that the “ignorance of some of the native rubber Inspectors may 
also have had something to do with the failure of last year’s sowing... Three of these men 
have lately brought into Benin City seed in a green and half grown condition, absolutely 
useless and of course wasted. One would-be Rubber Inspector was a small boy about 14 
who would be of about much use as a process server in Ireland of the same age.”39 In 
1907, Egerton noted their frequent abuses of power (not stating what these were), 
writing that “there are the strongest objections to the multiplication of native Forest 
guards with semi police powers carrying on their work in places far away from 
European supervision.”40 
These problems mirrored those of other wild rubber producers in Africa. The worst 
destruction occurred where it was impossible to keep out interlopers. In the Congo, 
concessionary companies were willing to make short-term profits and go bust, giving 
their agents incentives to over-exploit local vines (Harms, 1975). Around Lagos and 
Ibadan, slaughter-tapping may have been introduced by Fante workers imported by the 
governor (Omosini, 1979). In French Guinea, officials worried that “bandit” rubber 
collectors, who roamed the countryside in search of vines, were responsible for 
bleeding them to death (Osborn, 2004), Similarly, locals in the Ivory Coast complained 
that they were unable to prevent itinerant harvesters from extracting as much rubber as 
possible before moving on (Harms, 1975, p. 76). 
Over-tapping also followed the weakening of African states. Dumett (1971) 
emphasizes that the destruction of rubber was less severe in Asante than around Cape 
Coast. Around Kumasi, tappers often obtained forest on arrangement from local chiefs, 
who demanded fees or shares (Dumett, 1971, p. 98).41 In Benin, the British exiled the 
Oba and freed many of slaves on whom the chiefs depended (Igbafe, 1975). Other 
political functions defined in relation to the king became meaningless. As Bradbury 
(1973, p. 86) puts it, “British administrators at Benin had to construct an administrative 
bricolage out of their own meagre resources of personnel and the fragments of a 
shattered indigenous polity.” 
In Brazil, by contrast, property rights over wild rubber were well established. Para 
was largely collected from estates along rivers, owned by tappers, by patrons, or by 
                                                          
37 Quoted in Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 12 
38 NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899. 
39 NAUK, CO 520/7, 26/2/1901: Resident Benin City to Moor. 
40 NAUK, CO 520/45: Minute Dated 12 April, 1907 by Egerton. 
41 See also Arhin (1980) and Austin (2005) for rubber in Ashanti. 
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commercial firms (Barham and Coomes, 1994b, p. 55).42 The creation of rubber trails 
that connected wild trees helped to establish property rights over them (Weinstein, 
1983, p. 158). Patrons often resided on the estates, lowering monitoring costs (Barham 
and Coomes, 1994b, p. 55). It was the owner who brought labour in to the estate (Frank 
and Musacchio, 2006, p. 277). Critically, this allowed estate owners to select the 
contractual arrangement by which tappers were hired. Coomes and Barham (1994a,b) 
suggest that the typical debt-merchandise contract was selected to minimize risks and 
transactions costs, and to economise on the scarcest factors of production – labour and 
capital. Critically, estate owners avoided rental contracts, since these would have given 
tappers incentives to over-tap their trees (Coomes and Barham, 1994, p. 246). 
Labour scarcity 
 
These difficulties were compounded by Benin’s scarcity of labour. The population 
density of Benin was estimated at only 25 per sqm in 1927.43 Usuanlele (1988) 
interprets pre-colonial land and labour institutions in Benin as consequences of this 
sparse population. In rubber, monitoring was made more costly by a lack of monitors. 
Slaughter tapping may be interpreted as another of the labour-saving production 
techniques used throughout Africa (Austin, 2008). I do not believe labour-scarcity alone 
can explain the pervasiveness of over-exploitation. Destructive tapping was employed 
by non-Edo, and Benin successfully prevented similar problems before 1897, despite 
high prices. Further, similar environmental degradation has followed even in densely-
settled areas when states have undermined existing institutions – the post-colonial 
dismantling of common property regimes over water and forestry in Tanzania serves as 
an example (Sheridan, 2004).  
Though Brazil succeeded in producing wild rubber despite labour scarcity, this did 
influence tapping methods in different sectors of the industry. Tappers who collected 
Para rubber did not work the trees to death. These could be tapped repeatedly, 
providing income throughout an entire season. By contrast, caucho  rubber occurred 
more sparsely, and would not survive repeated tapping. Mobile teams of workers would 
fell these trees in areas where property rights were not established, drain them of latex, 
and move on (Barham and Coomes, 1994b, p. 45-46). Nigerian funtumia is analogous to 
caucho. Circulars issued during the Second World War advised locals not to tap the 
trees more than three or four times per year, while other officials were even more 
cautious.44 For the mobile non-Edo that exploited Benin’s wild rubber, methods that 
killed the trees were those that economised on scarce labour.  
 
 
                                                          
42 See also Weinstein (1983, p. 45-48) for land tenure. 
43 NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division. 
44 NAUK, CO 852 515 7: Commodities Rubber Nigeria. For the circular, see West African Rubber Mission 
Report on Nigeria and British Cameroons, Appendix 2. For the more cautious official, see 19 May 1943: 
Comments on Recommendations made by RM, March 1943 by The Custodian of Enemy Property, R.B. 
Longe. He recommended funtumia not be tapped more than twice a year. 
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4. PRIVATE PLANTATIONS 
 
Local Funtumia could be planted, and Brazilian Para had been introduced to Nigeria 
in 1895 (Anschel, 1965, p. 49). By 1921, however, plantations had not transformed 
Nigeria into the major producer it would become after 1945. In this section, I outline the 
difficulties faced by private plantations. European plantations were few, because of 
labour scarcity and government hostility to concessions. African private plantations are 
of limited visibility in the archival record, but also appear to have been small and faced 
similar challenges securing labour. These difficulties contrast with the rubber industry’s 
relative ease in attracting labour in Southeast Asia, buttressed by favourable colonial 
policies over land and immigration. They also contrast with the more labour-abundant 
Benin that emerged as a successful exporter of rubber after the Second World War. 
 
Overview 
 
The most concerted effort by a European firm to plant rubber in Benin was that of 
Miller Brothers. The firm acquired roughly five hundred acres at Sapele in 1905, and 
another 560 in 1911.45 This Para plantation was begun with 10,000 seeds imported 
from the East.46 Cowan, the director, testified to the West African Lands Committee 
(WALC) in 1913 that the plantation was paying rent to 5 or 6 different local 
communities. At that time, 800 acres were under cultivation and the bulk of the 400 
labourers did not come from Benin or Sapele, but rather from the more land-scarce 
Opobo, Kwa, and Ibibio territories (WALC, 1916, p. 468-475). 
In 1915, a return of agricultural plantations in Benin province listed five – J.G.M 
Cranstoun and Company’s at Sapoba, Messrs. MacIver’s at Sapoba, I.T. Palmer’s at 
Sapoba and Abraka, and the Nigerian Mahogany and Trading Company’s at Unutu.47 
MacIver and Palmer (an African) were both said to have rubber in good condition at this 
time. Egboh (1985, p. 159) states that Cranstoun had two plantations in 1908, totalling 
1,280 acres. MacIver reported in 1917 that they were doing no business in rubber, 
though their plantation caught the attention of Macmillan (1920, p. 73) and by 1927 
their holdings had expanded to 2021 acres.48 This and Cranstoun’s were later taken 
over by the United Africa Company, becoming the Jamieson Estate Plantation (Pedler, 
1974, p. 246). Miller’s estate at Sapele later became UAC property as well (Fieldhouse, 
1994, p. 204-5). 
Others were less successful. A German firm, possibly Bey and Zimmer, planted ten 
acres that were surrendered during the First World War (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 59). The 
                                                          
45 NAI, BP 311/1914: Rubber Plantation on the Ologbo Road, 18 March, 1911: Provincial Commissioner 
Warri to Provincial Commissioner Calabar. 
46 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905, p. 24. 
47 NAI, BP 603 1915 Agricultural Plantations Benin Province. Two lists are given in this file; the first omits 
Cranstoun, the second MacIver. 
48 For 1917, see NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division, 16 Nov, 1917: Howe (for 
MacIver and Co) to Acting District Officer. For 1927, see NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin 
Division. 
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African Association start an experimental Para plantation in 1906 at Warri, but James 
believed that they “[did] not seem to have pushed the matter further.”49 In 1908, they 
had an “excellent small Para rubber plantation at Eket.”50 The British Cotton Growing 
Association started a plantation in Benin territory in 1909, but in 1917 it was 
“neglected,” containing only 228 trees.51 
Less is knowable about private plantations owned by Africans.52 The Annual Reports 
and Igbafe (1979) take an upbeat view. In 1903, some “more intelligent chiefs” had 
started operations on their own account.53 In 1906, the Provincial Forest Officer stated 
that the “feature of the year ... [had] been the number of small private plantations made 
by individual natives, although it [was] difficult to say exactly how many [had] been 
made.”54 Igbafe (1979, p. 343-348) notes that 126 villages had been convinced to start 
plantations by the end of 1903, there were 369 private plantations by 1906, and that 
some 3,000 acres were owned by eleven private individuals or companies by 1925. The 
largest of these belonged to Palmer, reported to have 1500 acres at Abraka, employing 
900 labourers who were paid the same wages as in the timber industry (WALC, 1916, p. 
468-475).55 The Obaseki had two Para plantations, of 10,000 and 12,000 trees, 4 to 6 
years old in 1919.56 
Before 1921, however, most of these must have been small. Chief Ugo had a single 
acre at Benin (Egboh, 1985, p. 159). Thompson described those planted in the Benin 
City District in 1906 as “small private plantations.”57 A 1917 return of Para plantations 
in Benin forwarded a list excluding those with less than 20 trees, and “small private 
plantations of which there is no record”. It listed 270 started in 1914 or 1915, with 57 
seedlings planted on average. 
 
Labour scarcity 
 
These plantations had difficulty securing labour. Cowan told the WALC that his 
company did not use Edo labourers because, though they could make arrangements 
with headmen, the people were unwilling and would work for at maximum six months. 
He believed this was because the authority of the Benin chiefs had declined. Labour 
scarcity in Benin was also a result of low population density, exacerbated by competing 
demands from the state for road work and porters, and from timber concessions.  
African plantations faced similar difficulties. Cowan told the WALC that there were six 
African owned Para plantations of 10,000 to 30,000 trees in the Sapele district. They 
                                                          
49 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 38.  
50 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
51 NAI, BP 175/1917, Para Rubber Plantations, 19 June, 1917: D.O. Ubiaja to Resident. 
52 Usuanlele (2003, p. 60) lists Lawani Bokoni, W.A. Sagay, S.D. Garrick, Bello Osagie (a Yoruba, an Itsekiri, 
a Kalabari, and a Benin trader) as having plantations of “various sizes” during this period, though he does 
not specify what they planted. 
53 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1903, p. 19. 
54 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17. 
55 Pedler (1974, p. 246) identified him as a Sierra Leonean who had previously been an agent for the RNC. 
56 NAI, Ben Prof 2/6 BP 480 19: Agricultural Department Report. 
57 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17. 
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had been paying for labour by allowing workers to plant “catch crops” among the trees, 
and as a result, the rubber had suffered. In his view, they had “tried to make the thing 
pay as they went along, and they have been pennywise and pound foolish” (WALC, 
1916, p 468-475). 
The difficulties faced by rubber planters in Benin echo those of other attempts to 
create rubber plantations in Africa during this period. Three companies acquired land to 
plant rubber in the Gold Coast in 1905-6, but could not compete with cocoa farms and 
gold mines for labour (Munro, 1981, p. 271). In East Africa, expatriate planters had 
expected cheap labour, but within months of starting “all were complaining loudly and 
bitterly about their labour difficulties” (Munro, 1983, p. 374). 
This was, by contrast, a period during which estates and smallholders in Asia 
successfully expanded production. Clarence-Smith (2010), contrasting rubber’s success 
in Indonesia with its failure in the Congo, emphasizes that Sumatran smallholders, like 
successful Benin planters later on, recruited the labour of migrant sharecroppers. Large 
planters stated that they had left the Congo for Asia because of inadequate transport 
facilities and labour supply. Estates in Ceylon, Malaya and Sumatra were worked by 
immigrants from India and Java, while estates in Borneo and French Indo-China 
similarly relied on migrants (Bauer, 1948, p. 217). The government actively supported 
the immigration of Tamil and Chinese labourers; the former were used in tapping while 
the latter opened new land (Barlow, 1978, p. 43-45,51). Chinese labourers also became 
smallholders, developing two to four hectare blocks while working in mines or estates 
(Barlow, 1978, p. 39). The problems of labour supply that hindered Brazilian 
plantations will be discussed below.  
Benin’s success later on can also be partly explained by relaxation of the labour 
constraint, due to population growth, land annexation, and immigration. Usuanlele 
(1988, p. 249-254) gives the most thorough explanation. Direct taxes introduced in 
1916 created a need for cash income; the state had discovered a method for labour 
recruitment. Further, land annexations by chiefs, urban residents, and forest reserves 
encouraged individuals to plant trees on fallow plots to claim them permanently. These 
pressures combined with influx of Igbo willing to work as share tappers. Overall, the 
scarcity of labour relative to land was disappearing.   
 
State capacity 
 
In addition, the British were reticent to grant concessions to Europeans for working 
produce that Africans could exploit on their own (as opposed to timber). The African 
Association and Miller were both rejected for concessions in 1898 (Afigbo, 1970, p. 
392). Officials such as Moor and Gallwey opposed these, preferring “development by the 
natives themselves.”58 Evans’ application to rent communal plantations was turned 
down in 1911 (Egboh, 1985, p. 158). By Pedler’s (1974, p. 245-6) account, Miller only 
                                                          
58 NAUK, FO 2/179: 28 July, 1898: Gallwey to Under-Secretary of State. See also his letter from 13 May, 
1898 in the same volume. 
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acquired land after Cowan spoke with Egerton, who had recently come from Malaya and 
was disappointed that merchants in Nigeria seemed to be showing no comparable 
initiative in developing rubber. Where other individuals or firms acquired labour, these 
were exceptions that had “resulted from land transactions carried out by African chiefs 
before the policy of the protectorate government had been well established.” Phillips 
(1989) argues that the British came to favour “peasants” over “plantations” in West 
Africa for a long list of reasons bound together by the stability of indirect rule. British 
hegemony depended on the power of local chiefs, and their control over access to 
“communal” land was seen as integral to their authority (see also Berry, 1992). This was 
a policy borne of weakness. 
These difficulties were not unique to Benin. European firms throughout West Africa 
remained horizontally, rather than vertically integrated. Barred from directly engaging 
in agriculture and faced with a market in which export crops were produced by 
thousands of small, dispersed farmers, large trading firms chose to operate in many 
products and colonies, but to refrain from production (Hopkins, 1976). Prospective 
rubber planters elsewhere in West Africa found the colonial office unwilling to grant 
them monopolies even to collect wild rubber (Munro, 1981). Firestone’s success in 
Liberia came later. He gained concessions from the Liberian government in both land 
and tariffs that firms in British West Africa could not (Finlay, 2009, p. 77).  
These factors also gave Asia an edge. Land was more readily available to expatriates. 
The government in Malaya granted land to Chinese tapioca and gambier planters on the 
condition they also plant rubber (Jackson, 1968, p. 228). Malay residents sold their 
ancestral lands to estate groups and other outside interests (Barlow, 1978, p. 39). 
Barlow (1978, p. 27) lists political stability as an additional factor in Malaya’s favour. 
 
5. COMMUNAL PLANTATIONS 
 
The colonial government established thousands of small plantations of mostly 
Funtumia rubber throughout Benin, owned by local communities. “Communal” is the 
government’s term. At first seen as promising, it was clear before the First World War 
that these were in trouble. They suffered from labour scarcity and a colonial state that 
lacked staff and resources, was unable to transfer skills and information, and could not 
forecast future prices. Many of the same constraints restrained the development of 
rubber plantations in Brazil during the same period. These difficulties, as shown above, 
contrast with the conditions that allowed Asian producers and later Edo smallholders to 
succeed. 
 
Initial promise 
 
The communal plantations were started early on. In 1899, nurseries were 
established in a few district centres, so that plantations could be made to close to the 
villages. These would be used for seed to sow in the bush at the beginning of the rainy 
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season.59 Of 450 miles of road existing in the Benin territories, the Forestry Inspector 
planted 250 with rubber seed.60 In 1900, twenty large nurseries were established in the 
Benin territories to supply seedlings.61 All villages receiving timber royalties were 
required to establish nurseries from 1901 (Igbafe, 1979). 
Undergirding these efforts was paternalistic racism, made clear by Bedwell, the 
Acting Colonial Secretary, in 1903: 
 
It is not in the nature of the average West African to lay out capital for which 
there is no immediate return. He can understand the yam growing at his 
door; he can understand the cask of oil to be filled before his “boys” can 
return with the required cloth, pipe or frock-coat, but he will not sew for his 
son to reap; nor will a village work, of its own initiative, for the benefit of the 
next generation that is to occupy it. It is this difficulty that has rendered so 
great the task of encouraging the rubber industry.62 
 
The government distributed seeds and seedlings and oversaw tapping. The 
communal plantations were mostly Funtumia. 63  By the end of 1903, 145,000 plants 
had been established in 126 village plantations (Igbafe, 1979, p.343). There were 1,050 
communal plantations in the Province in 1906, 1629 in 1907, and 2251 in 1908 (Egboh, 
1985, p. 159). Similar efforts were made elsewhere in Southern Nigeria, though Benin 
was the model case.64 
These were initially seen as promising, and were encouraged by colonial officials. In 
1904, Egerton saw the boom in the rubber market and the development of trade as 
“gratifying,” and hoped improved methods would help prices eventually close on those 
paid for rubber from the Straits and Ceylon.65 Experiments were in progress to improve 
tapping.66 In 1905, Fosbery reported that rubber continued to show a “considerable 
increase,” predicting that “with systematic cultivation and collection it will become a 
valuable addition to the exports of the country.”67 In 1906, two pupils had just returned 
from the French School of Forestry in Mali.68 In 1908, there were 2,251 Funtumia 
plantations in the Central Province, containing 1,125,972 trees.69  
                                                          
59 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1899-1900, p. 10. 
60 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1899-1900, p. 10. 
61 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900, p. 14. 
62 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1903, p. 19. 
63 Secondary sources offer contradictory evidence. Igbafe (1979, p. 347) refers to Funtumia, while 
Usuanlele (2003, p. 58) states that the first plantations were Para, with Funtumia and Ceara “introduced” 
only in 1908. In the annual reports it is clear that Funtumia was the predominant variety: see the Report 
on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17, or the Southern Nigeria Annual Reports 
for 1907 (p. 11), 1908 (p. 15) or 1909 (p. 12). 
64 These are discussed in the Southern Nigeria Annual Reports for 1904 through 1911. 
65 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904, p. 19. 
66 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904, p. 24. 
67 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905, p. 21. 
68 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 38. 
69 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
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In 1910, several thousand communal Funtumia plantations had become large enough 
to tap.70 Tapping and rubber preparation were done under the supervision of the Forest 
Department, and in the presence of the owners. To coagulate the latex, the rubber was 
boiled, and then rolled into thin biscuits using a wooden roller on a table. The rubber 
was washed with hot water. These biscuits were then hung for drying and smoked in a 
long drying shed. The amber-coloured biscuits were reported to be of “the first quality,” 
produced “by means of simple appliances that can easily be procured by the natives,” 
and were sold for 6s 6d per lb despite a falling market.71 This was seen as a “very great 
improvement on the usual quality of rubber exported from Southern Nigeria.” Outside 
observers were impressed with these plantations; Christy (1911) reported that “[t]he 
system of native communal plantations so successful in Southern Nigeria is admirable, 
and should be adopted by all the west African colonies.” 
 
Labour scarcity 
 
Several problems were, however, already apparent before prices began to fall. 
Labour scarcity was apparent as early as 1901. That year, the Annual Report for 
Southern Nigeria noted that recent “changes in the social conditions of the natives of 
these territories, particularly with regard to slavery, render it certain that the capacity 
of these native carriers for their transport work is not likely to increase, at all events for 
some years to come, until a good native labour market is established.”72 In 1906, 
similarly, the Provincial Forest Officer reported that the Isoko and Urhobo were too 
involved in road-making to devote much time to plantations; where rubber had been 
taken up, palm oil had been abandoned.73 
The 1913 Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations detailed five major problems 
that were causing them to fail: first, the weakened authority of the local chiefs; second, 
competing labour demand from other sectors, such as timber areas, government works, 
road construction, and porterage; third, insufficient incentives for the local 
communities, even when the government waived its one third claim to the plantations’ 
revenue in that year; fourth, villagers’ lack of experience with the product, which was 
made worse by deferred payoff of rubber as a tree crop, and; fifth, sharp labour 
demands that conflicted with seasonal festivals and funerals.74 Tapping had to be done 
during the rainy season, when villagers preferred to do farm work and rebuild their 
                                                          
70 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910, p. 14.  
71 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910, p. 14.  
72 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1901, p. 8. 
73 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17. 
74 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
Compounding this was the uncompromising scheduling of the Forestry Department. The report’s author 
wrote that villagers objected “to the pressure at which we have to make them work in order to get 
through the large number of scattered plantations in the season and usually would like use to wait some 
convenient time between their festivals and funerals for our visit.”  
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homes.75 Results on the model plantations, similarly, could only be achieved by 
“constantly worrying” the Obaseki and Edosomah for labour.76 
The next year, the report on the communal plantations noted that it was difficult 
getting upkeep work done: 
 
The village people have shown very plainly that they do not care for the 
plantations. The Forest guards report that they have the greatest difficulty in 
getting any cleaning or clearing done. At Uburu Uku the forest Guards had 
been driven away when they attempted to get the plantations cleaned. ... At 
Ogwashi Uku and Abah very few men would be persuaded to do the work 
which was done almost entirely by the Forest Guards.77 
 
Similarly, in Ishan, the people were disinclined to do the work requested, and officials 
felt they had been wasting their time. Especially in Asaba, Ifon and Ishan, officials had 
difficulty getting men to work. Many chiefs complained that, “as their power had been 
broken, it was hardly fair to make them responsible for the boys not working.”78 In 
addition to the work of tapping and upkeep, processing was labour intensive. Latex had 
to be cooked at central cooking camps and let stand for eighteen hours or more before it 
was ready to cook. For people from outlying villages, this was not worth the time 
involved, and they would not stay behind to learn how to properly cook the rubber.79 
Officials recognized that their own labour requisitioning contributed to this scarcity of 
labour – the same report noted that the question of carriers “has been a difficult one. 
The Assistant Conservator of Forests is obliged to find his own carriers, except on 
leaving a station, to take him from village to village. These carriers are not paid and this 
does not help to make the rubber business any more popular.” In 1916, the Resident 
pointed out that it was not worthwhile for villages to send small quantities of rubber to 
Benin, and that they did not do so voluntarily.80 
The quality of Nigerian rubber, among the worst in the world after the Second World 
War (Anschel, 1965), was an issue for wild and plantation rubber. In 1906, it was 
reported that “up to the present practically the whole of the rubber exported is forest 
produce, rudely prepared by the native with little or no intelligent control of the 
collection.”81 At that time, most Funtumia was shipped as either “Lagos lump” or “Benin 
lump,” containing a very large percentage of water and impurities” and adulterated with 
latex from other plants.82 While I have found no direct evidence from Benin, the 
                                                          
75 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
76 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
Similarly, the state withheld royalties from Chiefs Eso, Oshodi and Obaseki in 1915 for failing to weed 
their plantations (Usuanlele, 1988, p. 222). 
77 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
78 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
79 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
80 NAI, Ben Prof 2/3 BP 523 1916: Proceeds from Rubber Sales; no date given, letter to Secretary, 
Southern Provinces. 
81 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 31. 
82 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 35. 
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experience of the Lagos hinterland suggests that low-quality production was a labour-
saving technique.  
In 1909, one official complained that, while all licensees and Ogas were instructed in 
the “proper method” of making rubber, the Yorubas “simply refuse to do it, as they can 
sell bad rubber near Illushi even if not at Siluko or Benin City.”83 Two African Rangers 
were sent to French West Africa, and returned in 1907 on a lecture tour that did 
encourage some quality biscuit production in Benin, but only 35.5 lbs were actually 
offered for sale (Egboh, 1985, p. 166-7). Biscuits took twice as long to produce and lost 
weight more rapidly than lump rubber; one official estimated that it would require 4s 
per lb to induce producers to switch (ibid.). The Adulteration of Produce Ordinance of 
1897 was used between 1907 to 1909 to prevent producers from producing lump 
rubber, but this was quickly withdrawn due to protests from European firms who faced 
declining supplies. The quality of Nigerian rubber did not improve – one 1918 textbook 
described “Benin ball” as “generally dirty,” having “rotten, woody smell” (Pearson, 
1918). 
The role of labour abundance in explaining the relative success of Asia has already 
been discussed above. Labour scarcity in Benin as a hindrance to rubber plantations 
mirrors the situation of Brazil. Coomes and Barham (1994, p. 253-256) suggest that the 
failure to develop plantations in Brazil stemmed from scarce labour, a high opportunity 
cost of capital (discussed below), and the long time to maturation for planted rubber. 
This list is echoed by Dean (1987, p. 39) and Weinstein (1983, p. 31-32), while Frank 
and Musacchio (2006, p. 275) similarly conclude that, “because Brazil was committed to 
a high-wage, labour-scarce production regime, it was in Southeast Asia that plantations 
developed.”84  Wages for plantation labourers in Brazil would have to have been 
competitive with the urban sector or with independent tapping, and high enough to 
discourage illicit sales. Daily wages in Asia were roughly one eighth those in Amazonia, 
and Asian labour had fewer outside options (Coomes and Barham, 1994, p. 253-256). In 
Asia, plantation labour was less mobile, there was no competing extractive sector, and 
cultivation areas were closer to the sources of imported food for the plantation workers 
(Barham and Coomes, 1994a, p. 100). Dean (1987. p. 65, p.81) acknowledges that 
labour scarcity was also encountered by planters in British Guiana, Surinam, and on 
Ford’s failed Brazilian plantation.85 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
83 NAUK, CO 520/83, Enc. 25 Sept, 1909: Unwin to Thompson. 
84 This is not a new view. Melby (1942) identifies labour scarcity as the principal obstacle to the 
development of Brazilian rubber.   
85 Dean’s main argument is that South American Leaf Blight, which was endemic in Brazil but not in Asia, 
was the main factor that hindered plantation development in Brazil. There is no similar record of blight in 
the history of Nigerian rubber, so it cannot be treated as a barrier to success during this period. The 
absence of endemic diseases specifically evolved to attack Para may have been one of the factors in its 
success in Benin after 1945. 
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State capacity 
 
Shortage of labour was not the only difficulty faced by the plantations. The colonial 
government was reliant on local chiefs to implement its programs, and these agents 
succeeded in appropriating the returns from the communal plantations. The state was 
short of the skilled staff and capital needed by the plantations, and so found it difficult to 
transmit expertise to locals. Finally, the government had underestimated the effect of 
Asian production on world rubber markets. Similar difficulties held back the 
development of rubber plantations, both in Brazil and in East Africa. 
While the proceeds of the plantations were supposedly to be split between the 
government and the local communities, their benefits went largely to the chiefs. This 
was true also of the model Para plantation on the road between Benin City and Sapele, 
which was owned by eighteen Benin City chiefs who had “provided the labour for it 
free.”86 Lugard, similarly, believed that “communal” labour meant “forced” labour, and 
opposed the plantations on these grounds (Egboh, 1985, p. 160). In 1924, the Resident 
chastised the Oba, requesting the District Officer to inform him that if his workers were 
“called upon to work for nothing, it simply means that they will leave their villages, and 
either seek employment with the timber concessionaires or elsewhere outside the 
division.”87 Bradbury (1973) notes that chiefs received one third of the wages paid for 
labourers they requisitioned, and a share of the profits from rubber. Some were still 
profiting from these plantations as late as the 1950s, though this hurt their legitimacy.  
A plantation established by the Forestry Department near Usonigbe had been turned 
over to the local villages around 1910, but in 1914 was appropriated by the Oba. His 
successor was leasing it to Palmer for tapping in 1937.88 A Para plantation on Sapele 
Road that had been damaged by fire was turned over to the Iyashere in 1916, since he 
was the only chief who had shown interest in it.89 One official remarked that “looking at 
it from a business profit and loss point of view the communal plantations have so far 
been a failure, except to the chiefs.”90  
In addition, the colonial state was short of human and physical capital – the trained 
staff and equipment needed by the communal plantations. The supply of seed was not 
always reliable; seeds imported from Cameroon failed to germinate, while poor 
germination had lowered the number of Funtumia planted in Southern Nigeria from 
234,878 in 1907 to 133,094 in 1908. Of the 622 plantations formed during that year, 
most were extensions to existing ones.91 Before 1911, thinning had been neglected, and 
the trees needed each other’s support to stand.92 At Agbor and Asaba, while thinning 
                                                          
86 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
87 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 18 Feb, 1924: Resident to District Officer. 
88 NAI, Ben Dist 1 BD 84 Vol 2: Usonigbe Native Court and District Affairs: 16 March, 1937: Palmer to DO; 
handwritten note by Jull. 
89 NAI, Ben Prof 2/5 BP 173/1916 Communal Rubber Plantation Management of. 9Nov, 1916: 
Conservator of Forests Benin Circle to Resident Benin Province. 
90 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
91 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
92 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
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was desperately needed, there was no staff to do the work. The report for 1913 
admitted neglect by the government, stating that “it is a breach of good faith and fair 
dealing to have started these rubber plantations as a native industry and leave them, 
now when maturing and needing thinning, tapping etc under European supervision.”93 
Similarly, Miller had obtained permission in 1916 to tap 400 Para trees on the 
Sapoba road, at a cost of 1s per tree for a season, but reported to the government that it 
had been unable to tap these because it was difficult to find a European supervisor, 
children and livestock interfered, and there were too few trees to justify smoke and 
drying sheds.94 
The District Officer worried that the villages were “disappointed with the results of 
their labour.”95 In Ishan in 1913, the Forestry Department was unable to tap the 93 
communal plantations.96 At times, one Forest Guard and one pupil had to supervise 
twenty men.97 That year, the senior Conservator of Forests suspended tapping “on the 
ground that the trees need rest, and the Forestry Department is short of officers.”98 In 
1917, there were no funds to supervise preparation and assist in the sale of rubber at 
Ubiaja.99 
In 1917, the government had to borrow pans, metal spoons, tapping knives, rollers, 
cog wheels, fittings, and bottles of acetic acid from Miller Brothers.100 Local tapping 
knives were “slow and bad,” though by 1914 a local “native imitation” of Para knives 
had been devised.101 Smoking facilities were inadequate, and could not prevent the 
cured rubber from becoming mouldy.102 The two smoking sheds at Benin City were 
poorly built, lacked proper heating and drying facilities, and were in constant danger of 
catching fire.103 
It was, then, difficult for the colonial government to transmit new skills related to 
plantation management, tapping methods, and output quality. Much plant distribution 
had to be done from the Onitsha Gardens. As early as 1906, it was recognized that this 
was a poor location relative to the Central Province. It was too dry and too far from the 
centres in which cocoa and Para rubber could be successfully cultivated.104 Para yields 
were estimated to be five times greater than those for Funtumia per acre, but there 
were only 6,000 acres in Southern Nigeria by 1922 (Egboh, 1985, p. 162). One officer 
reported in 1913 that the “native idea of a clean plantation is often opposed to all Forest 
                                                          
93 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
94 NAI, BP 510 1916 Para Trees Benin City Arrangement with Regard to Tapping, 12 Oct 1916: Herald to 
DO Benin City 
95 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
96 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
97 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
98 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
99 AI, Ben Prof 2/4: BP 403 17: Village Rubber Plantation, 3 July, 1917: District OfficerUbiaja to Resident, 
Benin and 9 Aug, 1917: Resident to Distirct Officer Ubiaja. 
100 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 
101 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
102 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 270 1917: Sale of Village Rubber Plantation, 28 March, 1917: District Officer to 
Resident. 
103 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
104 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 41. 
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ideas of soil protection and the arrival of a Forest Officer often leads to the plantation 
being swept and scraped bare of all needful and protecting surface soil and humus.”105 
Individual rubber samples mentioned in colonial correspondence were often poor – in 
1918 samples of locally grown rubber were reported to be “anything but good, and it is 
evident if the best results are to be obtained, that the Beni ‘Planter’ requires both advice 
and supervision.”106  
This too was a problem for Brazil. Capital there had a high opportunity cost, and was 
more profitably invested in establishing new rubber trails, setting up tappers, supplying 
them, shipping, and other aspects of the wild rubber trade than in new planting 
(Coomes and Barham, 1994, p. 253-256). Similarly, much of the capital that had been 
initially invested in wild rubber production in Brazil was unsuitable for plantation 
development; steamboats and the accounts receivable from tappers could not be easily 
converted into plantation equipment (Dean, 1987. p. 50). 
Finally, the return to rubber fell sharply once Asian production began to increase. 
While initially proposed as a year-to-year arrangement, the waiving of the government’s 
share of the revenues from the communal plantations soon became permanent.107 
Officials realized that the failure to anticipate the collapse of the world market was a 
major oversight on their part; the 1914 report on the communal plantations noted that: 
 
The possibility, in fact probability of a fall in the price of rubber was evidently 
not taken into consideration when these operations were started...A second 
and very important point is that the natives have not taken up the plantations 
with much enthusiasm. Every year the returns have been smaller and, most 
important of all, the natives have been kept waiting many months before 
receiving payment.108 
 
This echoed the failure of British planters in East Africa to forecast the magnitude of 
the impact that Asian production would have on world prices (Munro, 1983, p. 373). In 
Brazil, forecasts were similarly misguided. The peak years of price uncertainty coincided 
with the boom in worldwide automobile production. Producers believed that demand 
would increase at a rising pace, only to be find that technological change in rubber tyres 
dampened this growth (Frank and Musacchio, 2006, p. 280-288). 
The government admitted failure. The same report recommended turning the 
plantations over to the local villages, noting that it would not be remunerative to work 
them with paid labour. In 1916, the Forestry Department ceased to exercise any control 
over the communal plantations, and the commissioner of the Benin Province requested 
the District Officer to inform the “native owners” that, since the government “has given 
them practical instruction in the method of planting, tapping, and preparing the rubber 
                                                          
105 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
106 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 12 Dec, 1917: Herald toWatt. 
107 NAI, BP 76 1914: Communal Plantations Central Province; 16 Dec, 1913: Colonial Secretary to 
Conservator of Forests. 
108 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
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in those plantations, it is now their duty to carry on the work themselves without 
regular supervision and assistance.”109 Proceeds were then divided between the Native 
Authority and the villages.110 In 1918, the District Officer for Benin asked the Resident 
about his meeting with the local agent for Miller Brothers, concerning the continued 
purchase of rubber. “If there is no market for the Native Administration Rubber,” he 
warned “tapping should cease temporarily and the trees be allowed to rest.”111 The 
export market had collapsed. It was then “impossible to import rubber into the United 
Kingdom.” Miller Brothers were unable to ship rubber from Sapele to Great Britain. He 
sighed: 
 
It appears that rubber will not keep in this country, and unless a market can 
be found for the rubber products of the communal rubber plantations and the 
para plantations, it would appear to be a waste of both time and money to 
continue tapping and preparing rubber, as is now being done by the Native 
Administration (ibid). 
 
In 1921, the Director of Agriculture wrote his above-quoted memorandum 
abandoning rubber. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that labour scarcity and the weakness of the colonial state explain the 
difficulties faced by rubber in Benin before 1921.  I have argued that, in wild rubber, 
labour scarcity increased monitoring costs and influenced tapping methods. It raised 
planters costs in the private plantation sector, and made proper tapping and 
maintenance of the communal plantations difficult. The colonial state lacked the 
capacity to monitor the exploitation of wild rubber, and the resources to properly 
regulate access to Benin’s stock of wild rubber. Dependent on local chiefs, headmen and 
forest guards, short on staff and capital, and lacking foresight, the state’s efforts to 
promote plantation rubber were ineffective. The development of plantation rubber in 
Benin would not emerge until these constraints were removed.  
What are the lessons for African development? First, I have re-enforced the 
importance of several unfashionable determinants of technological change. Relative 
factor endowments, in particular the scarcity of labour and capital, held back the 
adoption of plantation rubber. Opportunity costs, especially the relative profitability of 
work in other sectors, had the same effect. A lack of state capacity at both the local and 
national levels prevented the government from effectively establishing property rights, 
enforcing regulations, or maintaining its investments. In addition, I have emphasized 
that geography is not destiny. In contrast to other examples of rapid diffusion of New 
                                                          
109 NAI, Ben Prof 2/5 BP 173/1916 Communal Rubber Plantation Management of, 2 March, 1916: 
Commissioner Benin Province to District Officer. 
110 See, e.g. NAI, Ben Prof 2/3 BP 523 1916: Proceeds from Rubber Sales. 
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World crops into areas where they could be grown, the transmission of rubber to Benin 
was delayed. Finally, no condition is permanent. Rubber in Benin boomed during the 
Second World War, only to decline during the country’s oil boom. 
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